1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	MATTER OF FMC CORPORATION,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 41
7	NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York
11	March 21, 2018 Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
17	FREDERICK A. BRODIE, ESQ.
18	NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE Attorney for Appellant
19	The Capitol Albany, NY 12224
20	DAVID G. MANDELBAUM, ESQ.
21	GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP Attorney for Respondent
	2700 Two Commerce Square
22	2001 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103
23	
24	Karen Schiffmille
25	Official Court Transcribor



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Appeal number 41, the
2	Matter of FMC Corporation v. the New York State Department
3	of Environmental Conservation.
4	MR. BRODIE: May it please the court, Frederick
5	Brodie for the State. I'll reserve three minutes for
6	rebuttal.
7	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.
8	MR. BRODIE: FMC is trying to stop DEC from
9	cleaning up contamination in neighboring properties around
10	FMC's pesticide plant, including homes and a school.
11	JUDGE WILSON: Can you can you help me with
12	the statutory scheme a little bit?
13	MR. BRODIE: Yes.
14	JUDGE WILSON: So starting with Section 914.
15	MR. BRODIE: Um-hum.
16	JUDGE WILSON: Does FMC have an authorization of
17	any sort as that's meant in the statute?
18	MR. BRODIE: It does not.
19	JUDGE WILSON: So how is it then operating to
20	deal with or store hazardous wastes?
21	MR. BRODIE: It's got them in various solid waste
22	
23	JUDGE WILSON: No, no, I mean, what's the legal
24	authority?
25	MR. BRODIE: What's what's the legal

1	authority
2	JUDGE WILSON: Or let me ask it a different
3	what does the interim status authorize FMC to do?
4	MR. BRODIE: It just authorizes it to continue
5	operating before it receives a permit. But they must stil
6	comply with the environmental laws. Now Title 9,
7	0913(1)(b), tells you that interim status is neither a
8	permit nor a license. So
9	JUDGE WILSON: So 0914 says, it there are
LO	three things they can't do without authorization, right?
L1	MR. BRODIE: Right.
L2	JUDGE WILSON: And one of them is to handle
L3	MR. BRODIE: Right.
L4	JUDGE WILSON: hazardous wastes, which the
L5	are.
L 6	MR. BRODIE: What
L7	JUDGE WILSON: Are they doing that with
L8	authorization or without?
L 9	MR. BRODIE: But what we're talking about here,
20	where where the wastes are getting over to
21	JUDGE WILSON: No, I'm I'm deliberately no
22	asking about the wastes getting over. They have other
23	waste that isn't getting over, right?
24	MR. BRODIE: Yes, they've got wastes that's not



1	JUDGE WILSON: Or some or or somebod
2	hypothetically who is operating an inactive storage site,
3	under interim status, has got hazardous wastes, and they
4	can't even have those without authorization under 0914;
5	isn't that right?
6	MR. BRODIE: That that's right.
7	JUDGE WILSON: So what gives them the
8	authorization to do that? Forget about the leakage; just
9	to hold the stuff they have. Is it the interim status or
10	is it some auth other authorization?
11	MR. BRODIE: The interim status would allow them
12	to keep going as they had been going. As they had been
13	going, the waste was in solid waste and hazardous waste
14	management units.
15	JUDGE WILSON: Okay, so is the interim status a
16	permanent license order or is it is there's a
17	there's a definition of authorization that's included

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in Section 71-2702(3), that is the definition of authorization that is to be used for se - - - for Section 0914. Are you familiar with that or no?

MR. BRODIE: No, I don't - - - I don't - - - I don't think that's the - - - Section 0914 says no - - - no person shall dispose of hazardous waste without authorization. Authorization - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Right, and authorization in - - -



in 71-2702(3), it defines authorization for the purpose of Section 0914.

MR. BRODIE: Well, I believe that - - - that section - - 
JUDGE WILSON: I'm asking how you meet that

JUDGE WILSON: I'm asking how you meet that definition. Is it under the permit license - - - but if you're not familiar with it, I can't really ask you.

MR. BRODIE: I - - - I - - I'm afraid that hasn't come up in the briefing.

JUDGE WILSON: Okay.

2.1

MR. BRODIE: So - - - but - - - but I will say
this. The - - - the - - - they have the waste in these
units. So interim status, they're allowed to keep going.
They're allowed to keep the waste in the units. But the
waste can't escape from the units. And that's a fallacy to
which the Third Department and appellees fall prey. "No
person shall dispose of hazardous waste without
authorization." Disposal meaning "Abandonment, discharge,
deposit, spilling, leaking, or placing any substance so
that the substance can enter the environment."

JUDGE WILSON: Now, some of that entered the environment a long time ago, before 0914 existed.

MR. BRODIE: That - - - that's right, but it doesn't matter, for instance, that FMC stopped using arsenic in 1974 or that it polluted before 1980 when the -



1	the Act was passed. The fact is that after FMC was
2	done making arsenic, the arsenic-contaminated waste
3	remained at the facility, in these storage units.
4	JUDGE STEIN: But don't you have to show that -
5	- assuming that leaking, for example, is not authorized.
6	Don't you have to show that at least some of that leaking
7	took place after Article or Title 9 even came into
8	being?
9	MR. BRODIE: Yes. And we have shown that.
10	JUDGE WILSON: And that's the arsenic leak after
11	that?
12	MR. BRODIE: There there is a on
13	pages 1671 to 1677 of the record, there's a list of
14	of overflow incidents, among others.
15	JUDGE STEIN: And and and does that
16	apply to OUs 2, 4, and 5
17	MR. BRODIE: Yes.
18	JUDGE STEIN: specifically?
19	MR. BRODIE: Yes. And the the overflow
20	from in
21	JUDGE STEIN: And what what time period?
22	MR. BRODIE: What time period? It 1671 to
23	1677 deals with the period of 1981 to 2008.
24	JUDGE WILSON: So I'm doing this I'm sorry
25	from memory; I should have brought the whole record

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1
        up here; it's quite large - - - but in my quick perusal of
2
        that, I thought that I couldn't find arsenic listed in
 3
        those pages. Is that wrong?
 4
                  MR. BRODIE: Oh, no, ar - - arsenic is
 5
        definitely - - -
 6
                  JUDGE WILSON: It's listed, okay.
 7
                  MR. BRODIE: - - - it's - - - if - - -
 8
        if one looks at the consent order, it lists, starting on
 9
        page 1148 going through - - -
10
                  JUDGE WILSON: No, I'm asking - - -
11
                  MR. BRODIE: - - - 1170 - - -
12
                  JUDGE WILSON: I'm asking about the pages you
13
        just identified before the - - -
14
                  MR. BRODIE: Oh, oh, no - - -
15
                  JUDGE WILSON: - - - table of things that leaked
16
        afterward.
17
                  MR. BRODIE: Yes, yes.
18
                  JUDGE WILSON: Is arsenic in there?
19
                  MR. BRODIE: Arsenic - - - the - - - the wastes
20
        are contaminated with arsenic. That's - - - that's - - -
2.1
        it's in this lagoon or impoundment, and in heavy rains the
2.2
        impoundment overflows or would overflow, resulting in
23
        flooding of off-site properties, including the schoolyard,
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including these houses that are surrounding the facility.

24

25

Now, in - - -

1	JUDGE FAHEY: Can I
2	MR. BRODIE: the 1991
3	JUDGE FAHEY: Can I excuse me can I
4	turn you to to just a a different question for
5	a second here? You we're here because of the hearin
6	question, and how long was interim status in place on thes
7	on this particular site?
8	MR. BRODIE: I think they've had interim status
9	since 1981
10	JUDGE FAHEY: So
11	MR. BRODIE: but, again, they still have t
12	comply with
13	JUDGE FAHEY: No, no, I'm not it's
14	it's not meant to be critical. I just want to know how
15	long it's been in place. So so
16	MR. BRODIE: I think since 1981.
17	JUDGE FAHEY: Since '81, okay. Now, was i
18	a in a situation where you're over thirty years, has
19	does the DEC normally act unilaterally without a
20	hearing going forward, saying we're going to clean it up
21	ourselves?
22	MR. BRODIE: Well, I I what happened
23	here was you had they were supposed to do thre
24	things under this consent order. They did some emergency
25	work

1	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
2	MR. BRODIE: then a study of where was the
3	pollution
4	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
5	MR. BRODIE: and then they had to recommen
6	remedial
7	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
8	MR. BRODIE: remedies and and
9	JUDGE FAHEY: Right, and then then I
10	got that, and you went forward and you
11	MR. BRODIE: we did all of that. That's
12	most of the twenty years.
13	JUDGE FAHEY: I I really want to foc
14	you don't have only have so much time. I want to
15	focus in on the hearing. I understand that. So you
16	so you get to there and you've got you got whatever
17	it is, CMA 9
18	MR. BRODIE: Right.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: which is a combination of tw
20	other CMAs that were in the report. You decided the
21	DEC then decided CMA 9 would apply, and you created CMA 9.
22	In this situation, in your experience, is a hearing
23	normally held when someone's under interim status for
24	thirty years?
25	MR. BRODIE: I don't know that there are

1	comparable cases where someone is in interim status for
2	thirty years, but I will say this
3	JUDGE FAHEY: No, just the hearing question.
4	MR. BRODIE: Just just the hearing
5	question.
6	JUDGE FAHEY: The hearing question is why we're
7	here.
8	MR. BRODIE: Well well, no, because there's
9	two independent reasons.
10	JUDGE FAHEY: I want I want to stick with
11	it, though. So is a hearing normally held for that period
12	when something's been there for thirty years? Don't
13	you have a hearing before you say you got to go and do
14	this?
15	MR. BRODIE: I I don't know of a comparable
16	situation, but I think that once it's there for thirty
17	years, and and you have fruitless negotiations with
18	the other side to clean it up according
19	JUDGE FAHEY: So, all right, that's a good point.
20	So what's the basis, then, of your unilateral action? It
21	seems that there's three statutory bases that are popular -
22	po possible. What are you relying on?
23	MR. BRODIE: Well, we're relying on both Article
24	Title 9, which doesn't require a hearing at all
25	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

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MR. BRODIE: - - - and Title 13, specifically,
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2
        Section 27-1313 - - -
 3
                  JUDGE FAHEY:
 4
                  MR. BRODIE: 5(d).
 5
                  JUDGE WILSON: 5(d).
 6
                  JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, 5(d).
 7
                  MR. BRODIE:
                               5(d).
 8
                  JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
 9
                  MR. BRODIE: Now - - - now - - -
10
                  JUDGE FAHEY: So when - - -
11
                  MR. BRODIE: - - - Section 4 says there has to be
12
        a hearing as to Section 3.
13
                  JUDGE FAHEY: Uh-huh.
14
                  MR. BRODIE: But we're not going under Section 3.
15
                  JUDGE FAHEY: So under - - -
16
                  MR. BRODIE: We're going under Section 5(d).
17
                  JUDGE WILSON: -- under -- and under 5(d),
18
        the issue seems to be cost effectiveness. So I have two
19
        questions for you about cost effectiveness.
20
                  MR. BRODIE: Yes.
21
                  JUDGE WILSON: One is, reading 5, sort of as a
22
        whole, I can imagine - - - and maybe - - - maybe my
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        imagination is limited, but I can - - - I can imagine two
24
        different things that cost effectiveness might mean. It
25
        means - - - it might mean, can DEC do this more cheaply or
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better or more efficiently than somebody else? And/or it might mean, when you look particularly at C and D together, cost of - - - so D, has, as its objective, the complete cleanup. Where C has its - - - has its objective, the rem - - - the remediation of an immediate threat, something - - something that is happening right now, not the complete cleanup.

And so cost effectiveness might mean, does it

And so cost effectiveness might mean, does it make sense to pay the additional fifteen percent to do a complete cleanup, instead of do - - spending eighty-five percent to do a partial cleanup. So first question is, do you have a view of whether either of those or both of those or neither of those is what's meant by cost effectiveness? And then whatever your answer is about cost effectiveness, what is the cost-effective decision, if any, that DEC made and where do we find it?

MR. BRODIE: You - - - let me answer the second question first, because it's easy. Cost effectiveness is found on page 2551 of the record, and it's also discussed in response to some comments from FMC on 2644 to 2646.

JUDGE STEIN: Is that your final statement? Is that what you're referring to?

MR. BRODIE: That - - right. That's the final statement - - -

JUDGE STEIN: So but is - - - is that - - -



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2
        particular rem - - - remedial action in and of itself?
 3
                  MR. BRODIE:
                                That's - - -
 4
                  JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So - - -
 5
                  MR. BRODIE: - - - that's right.
 6
                  JUDGE STEIN: So it doesn't compare it to any - -
 7
        - whether it's cost effective compared to what it would
        cost someone else or cost effective in - - - in terms of -
 8
 9
        - - Judge Wilson's question - - - immediate threat versus
10
        complete cleanup?
11
                  MR. BRODIE: No, I would - - - I would disagree
12
        with that, because the whole Statement of Basis is an
13
        exercise of comparing CMA 9 to these other eight remedial
14
        measures that - - -
15
                  JUDGE STEIN: But that's - - -
16
                  MR. BRODIE: - - - FMC recommended.
17
                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - completely different, I
18
        think, from Judge Wilson's question. It's comparing it to
19
        other remedial measures, but is it comparing it to what
20
        someone else could do or - - - or - - -
2.1
                  MR. BRODIE: Well, at the - - at the - - -
22
                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - are you saying that those
23
        other remedial measures are not complete cleanups?
24
                  MR. BRODIE: Well, no, at - - - at the - - - DEC
25
        weighed the effectiveness and the cost, and you see that in
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doesn't that refer to the cost effectiveness of that

the Statement of Basis on the - - - on the pages I cited.

Now, at the time the Statement of Basis is issued, FMC hasn't yet refused. So we don't need to make that determination at that time, you know, as to whether we can do it better than FMC, or FMC can do it better than us.

JUDGE STEIN: So your answer is that all you have to show is that this is a cost effective measure, what?

Compared to what?

MR. BRODIE: Well, certainly compared to the other measures that - - - that were proposed by FMC, and - - - and that's analyzed in the Statement of Basis. But the point is, that then after the Statement of Basis, we engaged in almost a year of negotiations with FMC, and they ultimately sent - - - and this is on page 2711 of the record - - an email saying, we don't see a path forward; we - - we don't see any way to go forward.

So now you have a choice between DEC doing the remedy and nobody doing the remedy. And at that point, it is certainly, both the remedy is cost effective itself, as DEC found, and it's cost effective for DEC to do it.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, if we were to agree with you, what's the remedy you're seeking here?

MR. BRODIE: We'd like reversal - - - first of all, reversal of this interim status holding that says that facilities in interim status don't have to comply with the



environmental laws, because that's wrong. Secondly,

reversal of the holding that you have to have a hearing - 
- an adversary hearing - - - on the selection of remedy.

The hearing provision isn't implicated by 5(d). And also

the hearing provision, which is - - - which is Section 4 
- - only applies to hearings for - - - it - - - it says,

hearings to determine who is the responsible party.

Well, you know, we know who the responsible party

Well, you know, we know who the responsible party is. So we don't need that hearing. There's no provision that says that you get a hearing on the selection of remedy. And why? Because the - - - the polluter does not choose the remedy. DEC chooses the remedy. And what happens due-process-wise is, you get an Article 78, if you don't like the remedy - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Well, that sort of - - - that sort of goes - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

MR. BRODIE: - - and unfortunately this Article 78 went by the boards.

JUDGE WILSON: But that really sort of goes to the question Judge Fahey was asking you. Put the thirty years aside, what is the normal practice? That is, if it comes down to a choice of remedy, is anyone ever given a hearing?

MR. BRODIE: Hearings are few and far between, and I'll - - - and I'll tell you why - - -  $\phantom{a}$ 



1	JUDGE WILSON: No, are they always for the
2	purpose of identifying the polluter?
3	MR. BRODIE: Well, right, yes, because
4	JUDGE WILSON: That's what they're for.
5	MR. BRODIE: because we know who the
6	polluter is.
7	JUDGE WILSON: No, no, no. When you you do
8	hold hearings sometimes, right?
9	MR. BRODIE: I'm sorry?
10	JUDGE WILSON: You hold hearings sometimes?
11	MR. BRODIE: Sometimes, yes.
12	JUDGE WILSON: Okay, when those hearings are
13	held, are they always for the purpose of identifying the
14	polluter, the responsible party? Are they sometimes for
15	that? Are they never for that? Are they sometimes for the
16	purpose of choosing the remedy or getting evidence about
17	the possible remedy?
18	MR. BRODIE: There has been, to my knowledge, no
19	hearing no administrative hearing for the
20	purpose of choosing a remedy. The hearings are for the
21	purpose of identifying, are you a responsible party; are
22	you not a responsible party.
23	And and if I can wrap up with one thought,
24	as far

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, just - - - I'm sorry. So

the - - - when is the opportunity to challenge DEC's choice of remedy? When do they have the opportunity to challenge that? Other than to argue - - -

MR. BRODIE: They have - - - they have - - 
JUDGE RIVERA: - - - with you back and forth, and
you say, well, we've decided this is the remedy.

MR. BRODIE: They have two opportunities.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.

MR. BRODIE: Number one, in the Article 78 - - - JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. BRODIE: And they did challenge it. They said it's arbitrary and capricious. On remand, the court can assess that challenge and it can assess our defenses, none of which were assessed.

And - - - and secondly, when FMC - - - when DEC's spends the money, then comes back with a bill and sues them under CERCLA, they get all the defenses in federal court that CERCLA provides, including the defense that the remedy is not consistent with the National Contingency Plan. And one of the things that the National Contingency Plan requires is that the remedy be cost effective. And there are also case law - - - there's also case law that we're citing in our brief that says that remedies that are arbitrary and capricious can be challenged as not in compliance with the National Contingency Plan.



1	And it's a very long regulatory cite for the
2	National Contingency Plan. I will get it for you in the
3	rebuttal.
4	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
5	Counsel?
6	MR. MANDELBAUM: Thank you, Your Honors. Good
7	afternoon. My name is David Mandelbaum, of Greenberg
8	Traurig for FMC.
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Mandelbaum?
10	MR. MANDELBAUM: Yes.
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I have a question for you.
12	So so no one has ordered you, FMC, to take any
13	action? No one has ordered you to pay any money yet? So
14	focus right in for me, why is it that you get to dictate
15	what they do on someone else's property?
16	MR. MANDELBAUM: Okay. It's not exactly true
17	that no one's ordered us to do anything
18	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So what have
19	MR. BRODIE: The 1991
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What have you been ordered
21	to do?
22	MR. MANDELBAUM: AOC, Administrative Order
23	on Consent, is a correctly action order.
24	JUDGE WILSON: That's
25	MR. MANDELBAUM: That is



1 JUDGE WILSON: That's an order that you consented 2 3 MR. MANDELBAUM: That's right and we - - -4 JUDGE WILSON: - - - and it's been terminated. 5 MR. MANDELBAUM: No, it's only - - - they say it 6 was closed for operable units 2, 4, and 5. It remains open 7 as to everything else, and it has no closure provision. 8 JUDGE WILSON: But we're only here about 2, 4, 9 and 5.10 MR. MANDELBAUM: I understand that, Your Honor. The - - - we've - - - in 2, 4, and 5, we have done a number 11 12 of interim corrective measures, under that order. 13 If - - - if you'll allow me, the - - - I want to 14 get to your question, which is "Why do we get to be here?" 15 We get to be here because they wrote us a letter. 16 letter said, you have refused and therefore we are 17 proceeding. We challenged the premise of that, which was -- - the predicate to that in the letter was that the final 18 19 Statement of Basis created a present obligation on FMC to 20 implement CMA 9, which we don't believe is true. 21 believe the selection of CMA 9 is an interim step in fixing 22 that obligation on FMC. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Can I take you a step back to - -24 MR. MANDELBAUM: Yes, sir.



JUDGE FAHEY: - - - to your challenge, Mr.

1	Mandelbaum, initially? Did you ever challenge the fact
2	that you weren't given a hearing in Supreme Court on any of
3	the issues that you're raising before us outside of the
4	hearing issue?
5	MR. MANDELBAUM: Yes, we didn't we didn't
6	specifically focus on the hearing aspect. We focused on
7	the fact that we req that in order for that
8	obligation to perform to attach
9	JUDGE FAHEY: So that it was procedurally
10	defective; is that right?
11	MR. MANDELBAUM: No.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: No? Go ahead.
13	MR. MANDELBAUM: No, because we said, you have to
14	either issue us an order
15	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
16	MR. MANDELBAUM: or you have to issue us a
17	permit. And both
18	JUDGE FAHEY: And I'm wondering here's why
19	I'm asking. I'm wondering what the basis is for the
20	Appellate Division to have moved to this hearing question
21	when I could not find it in the in the underlying
22	actions that were taken by Supreme Court, and while
23	and it's really not in the briefs in the Appellate Division
24	either.

So unless you can point me to a place that you

want me to look at on, I'll be happy to do that in the Appellate Division briefs. You don't have to do it now; you - - - but - - - but I - - - are they there or am I missing something?

MR. MANDELBAUM: Yeah, we said - - - which I think is actually more precise than what the Appellate Division said - - - we said, look, there are three ways that you can impose this obligation on FMC. You can do it the way it has been done and is, in effect, the regular way under RCRA interim status, right. Interim status is the way legacy industrial sites are managed.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

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2.2

MR. MANDELBAUM: The - - - the task of writing a - - a full hazardous waste management facility permit is very onerous, and when you have a facility, like FMC, which no longer creates new hazardous waste, you have this interim status, which is continuous. There is a corrective action obligation there. The way corrective obli - - - action obligation for past releases or continuing releases of hazardous waste from that facility is addressed is by issuance of an order under 3008(h) of the federal statute and check - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: You - - - you're losing me. I - - - I want to know, did you request a hearing?

MR. MANDELBAUM: We said, you need to give us a



1 permit or an order. Every way to a permit or an order 2 requires a hearing. The Appellate Division fixed on the 3 hearing requirement, rather than the permit or order 4 requirement. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: The reason I ask is because it 6 doesn't appear to me that they had a basis in the arguments 7 before them to go to this hearing issue, outside of 8 reviewing the entire record and saying there wasn't a 9 hearing, and they went, aha, there wasn't a hearing here. 10 In other words, it wasn't really argued, and it wasn't - -11 - it wasn't argued by you or your opponent that a hearing 12 was requested or required. 13 MR. MANDELBAUM: Well, it was argued that we said 14 - - - we said, you must give us an order - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: Yes. 16 MR. MANDELBAUM: - - - that would require a 17 hearing, or you must give us a permit with a corrective 18 action condition - - -19 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - -MR. MANDELBAUM: - - - that would require a 20 21 hearing. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: So they disagreed with both - - -23 MR. MANDELBAUM: 24 JUDGE RIVERA: Excuse me. They disagreed with 25 what you argued, right? What you're arguing.

position is, I don't have to give you a hearing; I can decide on - - - DEC gets to decide this. We've made a decision of what's the appropriate corrective action.

You've got - - - as he's an - - - responded to me - - - you've got two paths by which you can challenge. One is the Article 78, which you have; you can make your arguments about arbitrary and capriciousness of the decision. Or when they come around and - - - and do the cleanup, and they say, you now have to foot this bill, you can make an argument at that time, whatever your argument may be.

But they claim that they can proceed without this hearing, because there are provisions, and they are correct in this way, that there are provisions under the law that let them do so without a hearing. You are identifying other provisions that do require hearings. But why is he wrong, when he says there are provisions that let us proceed without a hearing, that's - - that is what we used as the basis for imposing this particular requirement or choosing this corrective action?

MR. MANDELBAUM: Because I believe Mr. Brodie is incorrect in identifying authority that DEC has to proceed under 1313(5)(d).

JUDGE RIVERA: Why?

JUDGE STEIN: What about Title 9?

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let - - - I'm sorry. Just -



1 | | - -

JUDGE STEIN: Sorry, go ahead.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - Judge, give me that one.

JUDGE STEIN: Yeah.

JUDGE RIVERA: Why?

MR. MANDELBAUM: Because the - - - the sentence about cost effectiveness, which Mr. Brodie wants to make apply to the remedy - - - to CMA 9 - - - doesn't make cost effectiveness apply to the remedy. It applies to the decision by DEC to proceed unilaterally. The sentence is - - - or the phrase is "If, in the discretion of the Department, it is cost effective for the Department to develop and implement such a remedial program." Right, so the cost effectiveness moni - - - is a test for whether the Department should act. And among the factors the

JUDGE RIVERA: And where - - - where does it say that that's the interpretation?

MR. MANDELBAUM: I think that's - - - I mean, the modifier - - - it's the - - - it's modifying the - - - the next phrase, right - - - cost effective for the Department, yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying based on the language found in this provision, you're saying this is the only way one could interpret.



MR. MANDELBAUM: No, because if you look at the factors that the Department must consider, one of the things that the factor must consider is the availability of someone else to do it, a responsible party, that's d(2), and - - -JUDGE WILSON: But that still leaves open my question I think, which is, is cost effectiveness vis-a-vis - - - that is, let's take your argument for granted, that it's about whether the Department should act, right, but it still might be, should - - - is this cost effective for the 

Department to do a total cleanup - - - cleanup versus a

partial one, or is it cost effective vis-a-vis somebody

else doing it. Do you have a view on that?

MR. MANDELBAUM: Yes, I think it's cost effective vis-a somebody else doing it, and it can't possibly be - - - be cost - - - it cannot possibly be more cost effective to the State for the State to do it itself, than for it to issue an order to FMC, where FMC has said, all we want is our day in court. So if that order becomes effective, FMC will comply with it, until such time as a court rules and says it's an improper order. This is going to be decades.

JUDGE STEIN: Maybe the State can get labor done more cheaply than you can. I mean  $-\ -\ -$ 

MR. MANDELBAUM: That actually is - - 
JUDGE STEIN: - - - it's not impossible, right?



MR. MANDELBAUM: That's - - - that's - - - that's 1 2 contrary to, sort of, my entire experience, in a Superfund 3 world. 4 JUDGE STEIN: Well, theoretically. 5 Hypothetically. 6 MR. MANDELBAUM: But it - - - but there's no such 7 The finding here is - - finding. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: But what - - - what - - - what if 9 - - - what if you're wrangling for another thirty years? And they say, well, we're not going to wait around for all 10 11 of the toxic results of allowing this waste to contaminate 12 these surrounding areas; we're going to act now. 13 MR. MANDELBAUM: We have not been wrangling, Your 14 We've been - - - we've been following the process Honor. 15 as laid out by the regulators. We got to the end a few 16 years ago and came to - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: All right, let me ask it a 18 different way. What happens when - - - what he describes, 19 you and the DEC are at - - - are at this impasse. You say, 20 we think this is good enough to - - - to clean up and make 21 this a safe area, and they say, no, it's not good enough; 2.2 we need more; we need X to happen. 23 MR. MANDELBAUM: Issue us an order. 24 JUDGE RIVERA: What happens now? 25 They should issue us an order. MR. MANDELBAUM:

1	We will get a hearing. The hearing should go promptly.
2	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Should or must?
3	MR. MANDELBAUM: They mu they must either
4	issue us an order
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Pursuant to
6	MR. MANDELBAUM: To either it would either
7	be a corrective action order, under 71-2727, which would
8	require a hearing, or it or they would issue us an
9	order under 1313, the Superfund provision. Or they would,
10	as they have started to do, issue a permit for the
11	facility, which has corrective action conditions in it,
12	which would require a hearing, right. Those are the three
13	ways
14	JUDGE STEIN: But but
15	JUDGE WILSON: And back to Judge
16	JUDGE STEIN: but if they qualify under
17	5(d), right, then they don't need to issue an order and
18	give you a hearing, correct?
19	MR. MANDELBAUM: Yes, I disagree that they
20	they're qualified under 5(d).
21	JUDGE STEIN: So you disagree as to whether they
22	qualify, but you agree that if they qualify, then no order
23	is necessary and no hearing is necessary?
24	MR. MANDELBAUM: That's right, but they haven't



made the findings that would allow 5(d) - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Okay. 2 MR. MANDELBAUM: - - - to occur. 3 JUDGE STEIN: And what about also under Title 9? 4 If they - - -5 MR. MANDELBAUM: Under - - - yes. 6 JUDGE STEIN: - - - qualify under Title 9, 7 there's no provision for a hearing, right? 8 MR. MANDELBAUM: That's right. Mr. Brodie is 9 simply incorrect as to the releases from the facility. 10 First of all, he's quoting from the remedial fi - - - the 11 remedial facilities investigation, the document prepared 12 under the AOC, right. And - - - and all of the - - - all 13 of the releases that he's describing are overflows from the 14 Western Surface Impoundment. There are, like, two or three 15 of them there. You'll notice each one mentions comparisons 16 to the permit. The permit is the wastewater discharge 17 permit, because the Western Surface Impoundment goes 18 through - - - the waste water discharge system does not go 19 to OU 2, 4, and 5 - - is regulated under the wastewater 20 discharge laws and is exempt from hazardous waste 2.1 regulation. I mean, this is something that came up very 22 late. It came up in - - - in supplemental affidavits in 23 the Appellate Division, and it's - - - pardon me - - -24 concocted.

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JUDGE WILSON: Right, I mean, you're authorized.

1	But let me let me but so let me leave the facts
2	for a second to go back to Judge Stein's question on 0914,
3	0916.
4	MR. MANDELBAUM: Yeah.
5	JUDGE WILSON: It and put FMC aside
6	if it if I go and dump a bunch of toxic waste
7	somewhere, they don't have to give a hearing. They can go
8	
9	MR. MANDELBAUM: That's correct.
10	JUDGE WILSON: right on okay.
11	MR. MANDELBAUM: That's correct.
12	JUDGE WILSON: I just want to make sure I have
13	that right.
14	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
15	MR. MANDELBAUM: Thank you.
16	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Brodie?
17	MR. BRODIE: Thank you, Your Honor.
18	Ministerial items first. National Contingency
19	Plan, cost effectiveness, 40 C.F.R. 300.430(f)(l)(ii)(D).
20	So if FMC wants to challenge cost effectiveness at the
21	CERCLA lawsuit in federal court, they can do that.
22	Now do you do not need an order or a
23	hearing under 5(d). Why is that? The order and hearing
24	provisions were adopted in 1979. That's 4 and 3(a). At
25	the time, the State Superfund didn't exist. DEC,

therefore, lacked significant funds to conduct the remediation itself. It had - - - if it wanted to remediate a big site, it had to order the responsible person to do so.

The legislature then determined that FMC needed more flexibility, and some of this legislative history is cited in our briefs. So it passed the State Superfund Law in 1982, three years later. After that, the State could remediate using the State Superfund Law, and it was no longer required to order the responsible party to clean up.

And here is the critical, critical point. 5(d), the provision under which we're going - - - under which we say there's no hearing, no order required, was adopted in the very same enactment as the State Superfund Law. Laws of 1982, Chapter 857. So look what the legislature does. It says, DEC, here's some money, plus you no longer have to have an - - issue an order or have a hearing. Under 5(d), as long as you think it's cost effective, you can go forward.

Now the State Superfund - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What's - - - what's the - - - what's the point of 5(d)(ii), identifying the owner who financially has resources?

MR. BRODIE: Well, they have to - - - that's something they should consider, and DEC, in fact,



considered that. It identified the owner. Everyone knew 1 2 who the owner was. And after the - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: But I'm saying, what - - - what's 4 the point of the identification of the person, if - - - if 5 this - - - if it says cost effectiveness? 6 MR. BRODIE: Well, it certainly - - - and the 7 legislature knew how to set conditions, and they didn't set 8 as a condition that you find that you are a - - a better 9 remediator than the owner. Although I would argue that 10 when the owner says, no, we're not going to remediate, then that, by default, makes you a better remediator. 11 12 JUDGE STEIN: Does our Superfund Coalition case 13 suggest that a hearing is necessary under 5(d)? 14 MR. BRODIE: Superfund hearing - - - Superfund 15 Coalition case, actually - - - and I've got the cite on it 16 --- it --- it actually supports DEC's argument, because 17 it says 1313(5)(d) does not apply where DEC orders a 18 responsible party to implement a remedial program. 19 18 N.Y.3d at 296 to 297. Now later on, they talk about the 20 right to a hearing, but they talk about that specifically 21 with regard to the issuance of an order. 22 When you're not issuing an order, under 23 1313(5)(d), the Superfund Coalition case, on the pages I 24 cited, is absolutely clear that you - - - that you - - -

you don't need an order. You can go without one, and

that's - - - that's what we're saying.

Now, does this mean that the provisions requiring an order are unnecessary? No, it doesn't. Among other things, DEC needs those provisions when there's insufficient money in the Superfund. At the moment, though, we have the money, and we want to remediate and this toxic waste has been on these people's lawns and the schoolyard for thirty years. And we need to get rid of it.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. BRODIE: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)



## CERTIFICATION I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of FMC Corporation v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, No. 41 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Karen Schiffmille Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 March 28, 2018 Date:

